[158] The question, known among American historians as the "riddle of Khe Sanh," has been summed up by John Prados and Ray Stubbe: "Either the Tet Offensive was a diversion intended to facilitate PAVN/VC preparations for a war-winning battle at Khe Sanh, or Khe Sanh was a diversion to mesmerize Westmoreland in the days before Tet. [125] The 325C Divisional Headquarters was the first to leave, followed by the 95C and 101D Regiments, all of which relocated to the west. The Laotians were overrun, and many fled to the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. As the relief force made progress, the Marines at Khe Sanh moved out from their positions and began patrolling at greater distances from the base. Officer casualties of all branches were overwhelmingly white. Due to severe losses, however, the NVA abandoned its plan for a massive ground attack. "[103] The Bru were excluded from evacuation from the highlands by an order from the ARVN I Corps commander, who ruled that no Bru be allowed to move into the lowlands. Enemy artillery rounds slammed into the runway. As a result, "B-52 Arc Light strikes originating in Guam, Okinawa, and Thailand bombed the jungles surrounding Khe Sanh into stubble fields" and Khe Sanh became the major news headline coming out of Vietnam in late March 1968. [86] The command and control arrangement then in place in Southeast Asia went against Air Force doctrine, which was predicated on the single air manager concept. About two hours later, an NVA artillery barrage scored a hit on the main ammunition dump at Khe Sanh Combat Base, killing Lance Corp. Jerry Stenberg and other Marines. The Battle of la Drang was considered essential because it sets up a change of tactics for both troops during the conflict. "[168][Note 7], Marine General Rathvon M. Tompkins, the commander of the 3rd Marine Division, pointed out that had the PAVN actually intended to take Khe Sanh, PAVN troops could have cut the base's sole source of water, a stream 500 m outside the perimeter of the base. Site will be misbehaving during our migration to new (better!) Construction on the line was ultimately abandoned and resources were later diverted towards implementing a more mobile strategy. [150] On 31 December 1968, the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion was landed west of Khe Sanh to commence Operation Dawson River West, on 2 January 1969 the 9th Marines and 2nd ARVN Regiment were also deployed on the plateau supported by the newly established Fire Support Bases Geiger and Smith; the 3-week operation found no significant PAVN forces or supplies in the Khe Sanh area. An additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II as of the end of June 1968. The PAVN, however, were not through with the ARVN troops. Whether the destruction of one battalion could have been the goal of two to four PAVN divisions was debatable. They were not included in the official Khe Sanh counts. The relief of Khe Sanh, called Operation Pegasus, began . Further information on the bombing campaign: Further information on the electronic sensor system: Westmoreland's plan to use nuclear weapons, President Johnson orders that the base be held at all costs, Operation Charlie: evacuation of the base. The US command in Saigon initially believed that combat operations around KSCB during 1967 were part of a series of minor PAVN offensives in the border regions. The explanations given out by the Saigon command were that "the enemy had changed his tactics and reduced his forces; that PAVN had carved out new infiltration routes; that the Marines now had enough troops and helicopters to carry out mobile operations; that a fixed base was no longer necessary. The 1968 Battle of Khe Sanh was the longest, deadliest and most controversial of the Vietnam War, pitting the U.S. Marines and their allies against the North Vietnamese Army. "[91][92], Not much activity (with the exception of patrolling) had occurred thus far during the battle for the Special Forces Detachment A-101 and their four companies of Bru CIDGs stationed at Lang Vei. [51] Other concerns raised included the assertion that the real danger to I Corps was from a direct threat to Qung Tr City and other urban areas, a defense would be pointless as a threat to infiltration since PAVN troops could easily bypass Khe Sanh, the base was too isolated, and the Marines "had neither the helicopter resources, the troops, nor the logistical bases for such operations." Westmoreland believed that the latter was the case, and his belief was the basis for his desire to stage "Dien Bien Phu in reverse. [140] Operation Scotland II would continue until 28 February 1969 resulting in 435 Marines and 3304 PAVN killed. Not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 U.S. Army, Royal Laotian Army and SOG commandos losses. But only by checking my service record while writing this article did it become evident that I had participated in all three operations. Khe Sanh was one of the most remote outposts in Vietnam, but by January 1968, even President Lyndon Johnson had taken a personal interest in the base. [45] In December and early January, numerous sightings of PAVN troops and activities were made in the Khe Sanh area, but the sector remained relatively quiet.[46]. The report, originally classified as secret, noted that intelligence from many sources indicated conclusively that the North Vietnamese had planned a massive ground attack against the base. Setting out from Ca Lu, 10 miles east of Khe Sanh, Pegasus opened the highway, linked up with the Marines at Khe Sanh, and engaged NVA in the surrounding area. [83] Westmoreland later wrote, "Washington so feared that some word of it might reach the press that I was told to desist, ironically answering what those consequences could be: a political disaster. [96], The Marines at Khe Sanh had a plan in place for providing a ground relief force in just such a contingency, but Lownds, fearing a PAVN ambush, refused to implement it. As journalist Robert Pisor pointed out in his 1982 book, The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh, no other battle of the entire war produced a better body count or kill ratio than that claimed by the Americans at Khe Sanh. Soon after, another shell hit a cache of tear gas, which saturated the entire area. Its mission was to destroy the Special Forces and their Vietnamese allies and to ambush any reinforcements coming from Khe Sanh. Throughout the campaign, US forces used the latest technology to locate PAVN forces for targeting. Lownds feared that PAVN infiltrators were mixed up in the crowd of more than 6,000, and lacked sufficient resources to sustain them. Minor attacks continued before the base was officially closed on 5 July. [10] Once the news of the closure of KSCB was announced, the American media immediately raised questions about the reasoning behind its abandonment. For example, I served with a Marine heavy mortar battery at Khe Sanh during the siege. However, North Vietnamese sources claim that the Americans did not win a victory at Khe Sanh but were forced to retreat to avoid destruction. At 00:30 on 21 January, Hill 861 was attacked by about 300 PAVN troops, the Marines, however, were prepared. The United States and its South Vietnamese allies pulled many huge offensive . The Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base broke out of their perimeter and began attacking the North Vietnamese in the surrounding area. [69] The Marine Direct Air Support Center (DASC), located at KSCB, was responsible for the coordination of air strikes with artillery fire. [125], By mid-March, Marine intelligence began to note an exodus of PAVN units from the Khe Sanh sector. The Marines knew that their withdrawal from Khe Sanh would present a propaganda victory for Hanoi. SOG Reconnaissance teams also reported finding tank tracks in the area surrounding Co Roc mountain. [123][124], Nevertheless, the same day that the trenches were detected, 25 February, 3rd Platoon from Bravo Company 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was ambushed on a short patrol outside the base's perimeter to test the PAVN strength. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. [29], During the second half of 1967, the North Vietnamese instigated a series of actions in the border regions of South Vietnam. The presence of the PAVN 1st Division prompted a 22-day battle there and had some of the most intense close-quarters fighting of the entire conflict. [75] On 22 January, the first sensor drops took place, and by the end of the month, 316 acoustic and seismic sensors had been dropped in 44 strings. One headquarters would allocate and coordinate all air assets, distributing them wherever they were considered most necessary, and then transferring them as the situation required. [61] To cover a defilade near the Rao Quan River, four companies from 2/26 were immediately sent out to occupy Hill 558, with another manning Hill 861A. The link-up between the relief force and the Marines at KSCB took place at 08:00 on 8 April, when the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment entered the camp. Military History Institute of Vietnam, pp. The new anchor base was established at Ca Lu, a few miles down Route 9 to the east. Thirty-three ARVN troops were also killed and 187 were wounded. "[52], Brigadier General Lowell English (assistant commander 3rd Marine Division) complained that the defense of the isolated outpost was ludicrous: "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere. They too were left out of the official Khe Sanh casualty count. [22] The camp then became a Special Forces outpost of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, which were to keep watch on PAVN infiltration along the border and to protect the local population. For seven weeks, American aircraft dropped from 35,000 to 40,000 tons of bombs in nearly 4,000 airstrikes. Mobile combat operations continued against the North Vietnamese. [59], During the rainy night of 2 January 1968, six men dressed in black uniforms were seen outside the defensive wire of the main base by members of a listening post. [147] The official closure of the base came on 5 July after fighting, which had killed five more Marines. [117], Communications with military command outside of Khe Sanh was maintained by an U.S. Army Signal Corps team, the 544th Signal Detachment from the 337th Signal Company, 37th Signal Brigade in Danang. The combat losses in February and March 1967 were a prelude to the "First Battle of Khe Sanh," one of the Vietnam War's hardest-fought battles, . On 22 March, over 1,000 North Vietnamese rounds fell on the base, and once again, the ammunition dump was detonated. American intelligence estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 PAVN troops were killed during the operation, equating to up to 90% of the attacking 17,200-man PAVN force. The pallet slid to a halt on the airstrip while the aircraft never had to actually land. [90], The Tet Offensive was launched prematurely in some areas on 30 January. On January 14, Marines from Company B, 3rd Recon Battalion, were moving up the north slope of Hill 881 North, a few miles northwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base. In the course of the fighting, Allied forces fired 151,000 artillery rounds, flew 2,096 tactical air sorties, and conducted 257 B-52 Stratofortress strikes. According to this history, originally classified as secret, the battle deaths for all major NVA units participating in the entire Highway 9Khe Sanh Front from January 20 until July 20, 1968, totaled 2,469. By the end of January 1968, he had moved half of all US combat troops, nearly 50 maneuver battalions, to I Corps. If firepower determined the outcome of the fight, it was airlift that allowed the defenders to hold their positions. [139] The 11th Engineers proclaimed Route 9 open to traffic on 11 April. On January 31, while approximately 50,000 U.S. and South Vietnamese troops were occupied in defending or supporting Khe Sanh and other DMZ bases, the communists launched an offensive throughout South Vietnam. On July 10, Pfc Robert Hernandez of Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was manning an M-60 machine gun position when it took a direct hit from NVA mortars. Name State Date War Branch; 1: Steven Glenn Abbott . On March 6, two U.S. Air Force C-123 cargo airplanes departed Da Nang Air Base en route to Khe Sanh. Lownds also rejected a proposal to launch a helicopter extraction of the survivors. [12], General Creighton Abrams also suggested that the North Vietnamese may have been planning to emulate Dien Bien Phu. For a succinct overview of the creation of the CIDG program and its operations. Consequently, and unknown at the time, Operation Scotland became the starting point of the Battle of Khe Sanh in terms of Marine casualty reporting. [78], Thus began what was described by John Morocco as "the most concentrated application of aerial firepower in the history of warfare". The Marines at KSCB credited 40% of intelligence available to their fire-support coordination center to the sensors. Khe Sanh Incident - force.com Army Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Ladd (commander, 5th Special Forces Group), who had just flown in from Khe Sanh, was reportedly, "astounded that the Marines, who prided themselves on leaving no man behind, were willing to write off all of the Green Berets and simply ignore the fall of Lang Vei. [9], The precise nature of Hanoi's strategic goal at Khe Sanh is regarded as one of the most intriguing unanswered questions of the Vietnam War. [1] According to Brush, it was "the only occasion in which Americans abandoned a major combat base due to enemy pressure" and in the aftermath, the North Vietnamese began a strong propaganda campaign, seeking to exploit the US withdrawal and to promote the message that the withdrawal had not been by choice. By the end of May, Marine forces were again drawn down from two battalions to one, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. The PAVN claim that during the entire battle they "eliminated" 17,000 enemy troops, including 13,000 Americans and destroyed 480 aircraft.
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